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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Chul Boylon Gibbs appeals from the district court’s denial of his motion to
suppress. On appeal, Gibbs argues the district court erred when it found that Sergeant
Cagle had reasonable suspicion to extend a valid traffic stop by 30 seconds to make a
radio call for a K-9 unit.

Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
Sergeant Cagle saw hoses and a rope hanging down from the front of a car and
dragging on the interstate. (3/2/17 Tr., p. 2, L. 21 – p. 3, L. 13 1; 9/8/17 Tr., p. 13, L. 23 –
p. 14, L. 18.) Sergeant Cagle activated his overhead lights to initiate a traffic stop.
(3/2/17 Tr., p. 2, L. 21 – p. 5, L. 18.)
The car was very slow to pull over. (9/8/17 Tr., p. 25, Ls. 1-7, p. 27, L. 11 – p.
30, L. 21; see also Ex. 1 at 17:59:24 to 18:00:14. 2) The car continued to drive on the
interstate even as Sergeant Cagle was pulling over. (See id.) When the car finally pulled
over, and Sergeant Cagle made contact, he saw the occupants of the car furiously

1

At the suppression hearing, the parties stipulated that the district court could take
judicial notice of the preliminary transcripts in both State v. Junge, CR-2017-0274 and
the preliminary hearing in this case, State v. Gibbs, CR-2017-0273. (9/8/17 Tr., p. 7, L. 2
– p. 9, L. 8.)
2
The parties stipulated to the admission of a recording made by Officer Cagle’s
dashboard video camera. (9/8/17 Tr., p. 7, L. 2 – p. 9, L. 8; Ex. 1.) The digital file of
Exhibit 1 is titled ICV_20170208_175852_005852.mp4. The district court’s Order
Denying Motion To Suppress uses the video’s internal time stamp to cite to specific
portions of Exhibit 1, therefore, for ease of reference, Respondent’s brief will use the
same citation convention.
1

smoking cigarettes. (9/8/17 Tr., p. 11, L. 24 – p. 12, L. 18.) They were “rapidly puffing
cigarettes as fast as they could, blowing air in – blowing smoke as if they were trying to
fill the interior of the car with smoke.” (See id.) This was not a usual method of smoking
cigarettes. (See id.) Gibbs was later identified as a passenger in this car. (3/2/17 Tr., p.
2, L. 21 – p. 5, L. 19.)
The driver of the car was nervous and overtalkative. (3/2/17 Tr., p. 27, L. 17 – p.
29, L. 2; p. 30, L. 22 – p. 31, L. 12; ----see also Ex. 1 at 18:00:32 to 18:03:49.) A passenger
in the back seat, Ms. Junge, appeared to be scared and “very, very nervous.” (Id.) She
would not even look at Sergeant Cagle. (Id.) Gibbs, who was in the front passenger seat,
appeared to be nervous as well. (Id.) When Sergeant Cagle asked where they were
driving one person told him they were going to Twin Falls and another told him they were
going to Jackpot. (Id.) After getting the driver’s information, Sergeant Cagle returned to
his patrol car. (Id.)
When Sergeant Cagle got back in his patrol car he radioed for a K-9 unit, which
took approximately 30 seconds. (See Ex. 1 at 18:04:05 to 18:04:32.) Sergeant Cagle
then ran the driver’s information through dispatch. (See Ex. 1 at 18:04:33 to 18:08:04.)
After receiving information from dispatch, Sergeant Cagle went to speak with the driver
about the mechanical problem and show him what was hanging down from the front of
his car. (See Ex. 1 at 18:07:52 to 18:10:03.)
Sergeant Cagle explained to the driver that it was dangerous and he could not
drive on the interstate with parts of the car dragging on the road. (Id.) While they were
discussing what to do about the parts of the car that were hanging down and dragging, the
K-9 unit arrived and alerted on the car. (Id.)
2

After the K-9 alerted on the car, Sergeant Cagle opened the car door and smelled
the odor of marijuana. (3/2/17 Tr., p. 2, L. 21 – p. 5, L. 19.) Sergeant Cagle had Gibbs
exit the car and, when he patted Gibbs down, a small plastic baggie fell to the ground.
(Id.) Sergeant Cagle also found syringes in Gibbs’ coat pockets. (Id.)
The state charged Gibbs with possession of methamphetamine and possession of
drug paraphernalia. (R., pp. 39-40.) Gibbs filed a motion to suppress evidence gathered
during the traffic stop. (R., pp. 68-76.) Gibbs argued that Sergeant Cagle deviated from
the purpose of the stop when Sergeant Cagle made a call to request a K-9. (Id.) The state
responded. (R., pp. 81-103.)
Gibbs and Ms. Junge, who was charged in a separate case, agreed to hold a single
hearing on their suppression motions. (9/8/17 Tr., p. 6, Ls. 4-23.) After a hearing, the
district court denied the motion to suppress. (R., pp. 104-118.)
The district court went through each of Sergeant Cagle’s observations and
analyzed each one.

(See R., pp. 110-117.)

The district court criticized several of

Sergeant Cagle’s conclusions. (See id.). However, the court found that, considering the
totality of the circumstances, Sergeant Cagle had reasonable suspicion to extend the
traffic stop for 30 seconds to call for a K-9. (See id.) The district court concluded:
Having considered the totality of the circumstances then known to
Sergeant Cagle, the Court concludes Sergeant Cagle had reasonable
suspicion to divert from his investigation of the equipment malfunction to
initiate a drug investigation by asking for a K-9 officer to come to his
location. The duration of that separate seizure – approximately 30 seconds
– was also reasonable.
(R., p. 116.)

3

Gibbs entered a conditional guilty plea to possession of methamphetamine and
possession of drug paraphernalia, and reserved his right to appeal the suppression ruling.
(R., pp. 121-130.) The district court entered judgment and sentenced Gibbs to three years
with one year fixed. (R., pp. 135-145.) The district court suspended the sentence and
placed Gibbs on probation for five years. (Id.) Gibbs timely appealed. (R., pp. 149-151.)

4

ISSUE
Gibbs states the issue on appeal as:
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Gibbs’ motion to suppress?
(Appellant’s brief, p. 7.)
The state rephrases the issue as:
Has Gibbs failed to show the district court erred when it denied his motion to
suppress?

5

ARGUMENT
The District Court Properly Denied Gibbs’ Motion To Suppress
A.

Introduction
The district court carefully analyzed each of Sergeant Cagle’s observations and

the dashcam video evidence. (See R., pp. 104-117.) The district court found that, based
upon the totality of the circumstances, Sergeant Cagle had reasonable suspicion to extend
the traffic stop for 30 seconds to radio for a K-9 unit. (See id.) On appeal, Gibbs does
not challenge the legal standards by which the district court ruled on the motion, but
instead disagrees with the weight the district court attached to the evidence and argues
that each piece of evidence does not amount to reasonable suspicion to warrant a 30second deviation. (See Appellant’s brief, pp. 9-16. 3) Gibbs has failed to show the district
court’s careful and thorough analysis of the evidence was erroneous.

B.

Standard Of Review
The appellate court reviews the denial of a motion to suppress using a bifurcated

standard. State v. Linze, 161 Idaho 605, 607, 389 P.3d 150, 152 (2016) (citing State v.
Purdum, 147 Idaho 206, 207, 207 P.3d 182, 183 (2009)). The appellate court will accept
the trial court’s findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous. Id. (citing Purdum, 147
Idaho at 207, 207 P.3d at 183). However, the appellate court freely reviews the trial

3

Gibbs also argues that the “Inevitable Discovery Doctrine” and the “Good Faith”
exception are not applicable. (Appellant’s brief, pp. 16-18.) While these arguments were
raised by the state below, the district court did not rule on these issues. (See R., pp. 81103, 104-117. ) Since the district court correctly denied the motion to suppress on other
grounds, the state is not re-asserting these arguments on appeal.
6

court’s application of constitutional principles in light of the facts found. Id. (citing
Purdum, 147 Idaho at 207, 207 P.3d at 183).
The power to assess the credibility of witnesses, resolve factual conflicts, weigh
evidence, and draw factual inferences at a suppression hearing is vested in the trial court.
See State v. Valdez-Molina, 127 Idaho 102, 106, 897 P.2d 993, 997 (1995); State v.
Schevers, 132 Idaho 786, 789, 979 P.2d 659, 662 (Ct. App. 1999).

C.

Reasonable Suspicion Existed To Extend The Stop By 30 Seconds Because The
Car Was Very Slow To Pull Over And All Three Occupants Of The Car Were
Rapidly Puffing On Freshly-Lit Cigarettes In An Attempt To Mask Odors
The district court found that, under the totality of the circumstances, Sergeant

Cagle had reasonable suspicion to divert from the purposes of the stop to make a 30second call for a K-9 unit. (R., pp. 104-117.) The district court did not err when it ruled
this 30-second deviation was justified and was not unconstitutional. Pursuant to the
Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution “[t]he right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. A police officer may detain a
person for the purpose of investigating possible criminal behavior “if there is an
articulable suspicion that the person has committed or is about to commit a crime.” State
v. Wright, 134 Idaho 73, 76, 996 P.2d 292, 295 (2000) (quoting State v. Rawlings, 121
Idaho 930, 932, 829 P.2d 520, 522 (1992)). Such a detention “is permissible if it is based
upon specific articulable facts which justify suspicion that the detained person is, has
been, or is about to be engaged in criminal activity.” State v. Sheldon, 139 Idaho 980,
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983, 88 P.3d 1220, 1223 (Ct. App. 2003) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968);
United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 (1981)).
“Because a routine traffic stop is normally limited in scope and of short duration,
it is more analogous to an investigative detention than a custodial arrest and therefore is
analyzed under the principles set forth in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 20
L.Ed.2d 889 (1968).” Sheldon, 139 Idaho at 983, 88 P.3d at 1223. “Under the Fourth
Amendment, an officer may stop a vehicle to investigate possible criminal behavior if
there is a reasonable and articulable suspicion that the vehicle is being driven contrary to
traffic laws.” State v. Roe, 140 Idaho 176, 180, 90 P.3d 926, 930 (Ct. App. 2004).
“An investigative detention must be temporary and last no longer than necessary
to effectuate the purpose of the stop.” State v. Ramirez, 145 Idaho 886, 889, 187 P.3d
1261, 1264 (Ct. App. 2008). “Because addressing the infraction is the purpose of the
stop, it may last no longer than is necessary to effectuate that purpose.” Rodriguez v.
United States, 575 U.S. ___, 135 S. Ct. 1609, 1616 (2015) (internal quotes, brackets and
citations omitted). “[A]s a matter of course in a valid traffic stop, a police officer may
order the occupants of a vehicle to exit or to remain inside.” State v. Irwin, 143 Idaho
102, 105, 137 P.3d 1024, 1027 (Ct. App. 2006). “The stop remains a reasonable seizure
while the officer diligently pursues the purpose of the stop, to which that reasonable
suspicion is related. However, should the officer abandon the purpose of the stop, the
officer no longer has that original reasonable suspicion supporting his actions.” State v.
Linze, 161 Idaho 605, 609, 389 P.3d 150, 154 (2016).
The United States Supreme Court has held that, “[b]eyond determining whether to
issue a traffic ticket, an officer’s mission includes ‘ordinary inquiries incident to [the
8

traffic] stop.’” Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at ___, 135 S. Ct. at 1615 (quoting Illinois v.
Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 408 (2005)). “Typically such inquiries involve checking the
driver’s license, determining whether there are outstanding warrants against the driver,
and inspecting the automobile’s registration and proof of insurance.” Id. “These checks
serve the same objective as enforcement of the traffic code: ensuring that vehicles on the
road are operated safely and responsibly.” Id.
The Idaho Supreme Court analyzed the United States Supreme Court holding in
Rodriguez and held that a traffic stop, supported by reasonable suspicion, “remains a
reasonable seizure while the officer diligently pursues the purpose of the stop, to which
that reasonable suspicion is related.” Linze, 161 Idaho at 609, 389 P.3d at 154.
The stop remains a reasonable seizure while the officer diligently pursues
the purpose of the stop, to which that reasonable suspicion is related.
However, should the officer abandon the purpose of the stop, the officer
no longer has that original reasonable suspicion supporting his actions.
Indeed, when an officer abandons his or her original purpose, the officer
has for all intents and purposes initiated a new seizure with a new purpose;
one which requires its own reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment.
This new seizure cannot piggy-back on the reasonableness of the original
seizure. In other words, unless some new reasonable suspicion or probable
cause arises to justify the seizure’s new purpose, a seized party’s Fourth
Amendment rights are violated when the original purpose of the stop is
abandoned (unless that abandonment falls within some established
exception).
Linze, 161 Idaho at 609, 389 P.3d at 154. In cases in which it is alleged that a dog sniff
unreasonably prolongs a traffic stop, the critical question is not whether the dog sniff
occurs before or after the traffic ticket is issued, but whether the dog sniff adds time to the
traffic stop. Linze, 161 Idaho at 609, 389 P.3d at 154 (citing Rodriguez, 135 S. Ct. at
1616).

9

Here, the dog sniff itself did not add time to the stop; however, the district court
ruled that the 30-second call to request the K-9 unit was a deviation from the original
purpose of the stop. (See R., pp. 104-117.) The district court found that this 30-second
deviation was permissible because Sergeant Cagle had developed reasonable suspicion of
criminal activity based on the behavior of the driver and the occupants of the car. (See
id.)
The district court wrote a 13-page order denying the motion to suppress. (See R.,
pp. 104-117.) The district court noted that the initial purpose of the stop, based upon
items hanging and dragging on the road, was not challenged. (R., p. 109.) The district
court found, however, that the “less than thirty seconds” Sergeant Cagle used to radio for
a K-9 unit was a deviation from the original purpose of the stop and, thus, that deviation
was a new seizure which required reasonable suspicion. (See R., pp. 109-110.)
As an initial matter, the district court’s determination that the seconds it took
Sergeant Cagle to radio for a K-9 is a deviation was potentially incorrect.

“The

touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness. The Fourth Amendment does not
proscribe all state-initiated searches and seizures; it merely proscribes those which are
unreasonable.” State v. Rios, 160 Idaho 262, 264, 371 P.3d 316, 318 (2016) (citing
Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 250 (1991)). While the district court correctly noted
there is no de minimus exception to the rule that a detention be supported by reasonable
suspicion, the counting of seconds as a “deviation” appears to run afoul of this
“reasonableness” standard that is the touchstone of the Fourth Amendment. The cases
which establish the “no de minimus” exception involved delays of seven to eight minutes,
Rodriguez, 135 S. Ct. at 1613-1614, and two and half minutes, Linze, 161 Idaho at 609,
10

389 P.3d at 154, not mere seconds. Counting individual seconds is inimical to the Fourth
Amendment’s reasonableness requirement. See State v. McGraw, 163 Idaho 736, 741,
418 P.3d 1245, 1250 (Ct. App. 2018) (review denied June 8, 2018). (“Counting every
pause taken while writing a citation as conduct that unlawfully adds time to the stop is
inimical to the Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness requirement and is contrary to
United States Supreme Court precedent.”) Even if the district court’s determination that
Sergeant Cagle’s 30 second radio call constituted a deviation was correct, that deviation
was supported by reasonable suspicion based upon the totality of his observations.
The district court then analyzed Sergeant Cagle’s observations. (See R., pp. 110117.)

The district court gave little or no weight to some of Sergeant Cagle’s

observations. 4 (See id.) However, based upon the remaining the observations and the
totality of the circumstances, Sergeant Cagle had developed reasonable suspicion of
potential drug activity to permit the 30-second deviation to radio for a K-9 unit. (See R.,
pp. 110-117.) The district court’s determination was based upon its careful review
evidence presented at the suppression hearing, the preliminary hearing transcripts, and the
reasonable inferences from that evidence.

4

For example, the district court gave no weight to Sergeant Cagle’s testimony that Ms.
Junge had “a sunken face and facial sores that he believed were indicative of
methamphetamine use” because there was insufficient foundation that these
characteristics were indicative of methamphetamine use. (See R., p. 115.) However, the
Idaho Court of Appeals has found that an officer’s observations that the individual with
whom he was dealing “appeared disheveled and unkempt, had pock-marked skin, were
gaunt or underweight, and had missing or rotted-out teeth,” were consistent with
characteristics of extended methamphetamine use. State v. Grantham, 146 Idaho 490,
497, 198 P.3d 128, 135 (Ct. App. 2008).
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On appeal Gibbs argues the district court erred when it determined Sergeant Cagle
had developed reasonable suspicion to extend the stop by 30-seconds. (See Appellant’s
brief, pp. 11-16.) Gibbs does not challenge the district court’s factual findings, but
instead argues that when each individual factor is considered there was insufficient
reasonable suspicion to extend the stop. (See id.) Gibbs contends that 1) the delayed
time it took the driver to pull over; 2) the excessive cigarette smoking; and 3) the open
windows and sunroof on a rainy day are insufficient to constitute reasonable suspicion.
(See id.) Gibbs’ argument fails.
First, the district court found that the car was slow to pull over in a manner that
“was consistent with the driver intentionally delaying his contact with law enforcement.”
(See R., pp. 111, 115-116.) On appeal Gibbs simply disagrees with the district court’s
conclusion. (See Appellant’s brief, pp. 11-13.) Gibbs argues that, based upon his review
of the dashcam video, he thinks the driver of the car was simply driving safely. (See id.)
Gibbs’ conclusions that the driver was only exercising “due caution” in slowly pulling
over is pure speculation. Gibbs is asking this Court to reweigh the evidence and draw a
different inference than did the district court. Weighing evidence and drawing factual
inferences at a suppression hearing is the proper province of the trial court. See ValdezMolina, 127 Idaho at 106, 897 P.2d at 997; Schevers, 132 Idaho at 789, 979 P.2d at 662.
Even if this Court were to reweigh the evidence before the district court, the
district court’s conclusions are correctly based upon the admitted evidence. Sergeant
Cagle testified that it took an unusual amount of time for the car to pull over. (See 9/8/17
Tr., p. 25, Ls. 1-7, p. 27, L. 11 – p. 30, L. 21.) And his testimony is supported by the
video evidence. (Ex. 1 at 17:59:24 to 18:00:14.) The video shows Sergeant Cagle
12

catching up to the car and then pulling over, but the car does not pull over. (See id.)
Instead it continues to drive. (See id.) After reviewing the video evidence, the district
court agreed with Sergeant Cagle’s observations and found that the car slowly pulling
over was consistent with the driver intentionally delaying contact with law enforcement.
(R., p. 115.) While this fact, by itself, was insufficient to establish reasonable suspicion,
it was a reasonable inference that can be considered in the totality of the circumstances:
As stated above, however, the Court must consider the totality of
the circumstances known to the officer in determining whether the
detention of the vehicle and its occupants was justified by reasonable
suspicion. Having reviewed the dashcam video, the Court agrees that the
manner in which the vehicle responded to Sergeant Cagle’s overhead
lights was consistent with the driver intentionally delaying his contact with
law enforcement. While this may have many innocent explanations, it is
[a] fact from which Sergeant Cagle may reasonable suspect drug activity.
This fact alone would not, in the Court’s view, justify a detention for the
purposes of investigation of that suspicion. The Court simply notes the
inference Sgt. Cagle is drawing from that fact is not an unreasonable one.
(R., p. 115.)
Reasonable suspicion was also supported by the occupants of the car all rapidly
smoking freshly-lit cigarettes. (R., pp. 111-112, 115-116.) On appeal, Gibbs argues that
this evidence is not enough to support reasonable suspicion. (See Appellant’s brief, pp.
13-14.) Gibbs is incorrect. It is very unusual and suspicious for all three of the occupants
of the car to be simultaneously rapidly puffing on freshly-lit cigarettes. Sergeant Cagle
testified:
Q. And when you first pulled them over, were those passengers all
smoking?
A. Yes.
Q. And were they -- could you please describe the manner in which they
were smoking.
13

A. They were rapidly puffing cigarettes as fast as they could, blowing air
in -- blowing smoke as if they were trying to fill the interior of the car with
smoke.
Q. Was that suspicious to you?
A. Very.
Q. Why?
A. I have smoked cigarettes on occasion with friends, I see people smoke,
and that’s not the way people smoke cigarettes. People puff on them. If
they did that, they’d go through a pack every half-hour.
Q. Okay.
A. It’s very suspicious. And to me, it’s -- people are trying to put cover
odor in a car to cover the potential odor of anything illegal in the car,
whether it’s drugs, alcohol, et cetera.
(9/8/17 Tr., p. 11, L. 24 – p. 12, L. 18.) The district court found this was “not typical of
the way most people smoke cigarettes” and raised an inference that the occupants were
trying to mask the odor of some type of contraband. (R., pp. 115-116.)
On appeal, Gibbs attempts to distinguish State v. Brumfield, 136 Idaho 913, 42
P.3d 706 (Ct. App. 2001). (See Appellant’s brief, pp. 13-14.) Gibbs’ attempt fails. In
Brumfield, the officer saw the driver of a car was sitting up close to the steering wheel
while the passenger was sitting low and puffing “excessively” on a cigar. Brumfield, 136
Idaho at 914-915, 42 P.3d at 707-708. The officer stopped the car for driving with a
suspended registration. Id. When the officer approached the car, he could smell a cigar
odor. Id. The officer questioned the driver and the driver gave inconsistent statements
about where they were headed. Id. The officer next questioned the passenger, Brumfield.
Id.

Brumfield also gave inconsistent answers about where they were headed.

Id.

Eventually a K-9 unit arrived and alerted. Id. The officers found marijuana in the car.
14

Id. Brumfield was charged with trafficking in marijuana. Id. Brumfield filed a motion to
suppress evidence resulting from the traffic stop. Id. The district court denied the
motion, and Brumfield appealed. Id. On appeal, Brumfield argued the marijuana found
in the car should have been suppressed because it was the product of an unlawfully
prolonged detention. Id. at 915-916, 42 P.3d at 708-709. Brumfield acknowledged that
the initial stop was justified but contended the stop was transformed into an illegal
detention for a drug investigation. Id. at 916, 42 P.3d at 709.
The Idaho Court of Appeals held that the officer had reasonable suspicion, in part,
because Brumfield was puffing “excessively” on a cigar and the officer knew that cigar
smoke can be used to mask the odor of illegal drugs. See id. Brumfield and the driver
also gave inconsistent statements about the purpose of their trip, and the officer found
pork chops in the car. See id. Thus, like in Brumfield, the district court properly
considered the excessive cigarettes smoking as a potential masking odor.
Masking odors is properly considered a factor in determining reasonable suspicion
or probable cause. See, e.g., United States v. Wisniewski, 358 F. Supp. 2d 1074, 1090-91
(D. Utah 2005), aff’d, 192 F. App’x 749 (10th Cir. 2006). The Tenth Circuit noted that
even the scent of an air freshener, when combined with other factors, can support
reasonable suspicion:
“[T]he scent of air freshener is properly considered as a factor in the
probable cause analysis.” [United States v.] West, 219 F.3d [1171], 117879 [(10th Cir. 2000)] (citing United States v. Anderson, 114 F.3d 1059,
1066 (10th Cir. 1997); United States v. Leos-Quijada, 107 F.3d 786, 795
(10th Cir. 1995); United States v. Alvarez, 68 F.3d 1242, 1246 (10th Cir.
1995) (McKay, concurring)). This is because air fresheners are often used
by drug couriers to mask the distinctive odor of controlled substances.
West, 219 F.3d at 1179. Even a “scent of air freshener,” when combined

15

with other factors can support reasonable suspicion. Anderson, 114 F.3d at
1066.
Id.
Here, in addition to the excessive cigarette smoke, the occupants of the car gave
inconsistent stories about the purpose of the trip and, unlike the car in Brumfield, the car
here was very slow to pull over. Thus, the district court here, like the court in Brumfield,
properly considered the excessive smoke as a potential masking odor which can support
reasonable suspicion as part of the totality of the circumstances.
The district court then found that Sergeant Cagle “observed that all of the
windows were open about four to six inches, and the sunroof was partially open.” (R.,
pp.111, 116.) This was unusual because it was a cold and rainy day. (See id.) This
combined with the excessive smoking made it “reasonable for Sergeant Cagle to suspect
the occupants were attempting to air out the car in an effort to mask or eliminate the odor
of some type of contraband.” (Id.) Gibbs argues that opening the windows could have
other explanations and was not necessarily indicative of criminal activity.

(See

Appellant’s brief, pp. 14-16.) While Gibbs is correct, that opening windows while
smoking on a rainy day, by itself may appear innocent, it is the combination of that fact
with the other factors that warranted further investigation. “‘[A] series of acts that appear
innocent, when viewed separately, may warrant further investigation when viewed
together.’” Brumfield, 136 Idaho at 917, 42 P.3d at 710 (citing United States v. Weaver,
966 F.2d 391, 394 (8th Cir. 1992); United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1989);
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 22 (1968).) Here, the series of acts included the delay in
pulling over, all occupants of the car rapidly puffing on freshly-lit cigarettes, and an
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attempt to disguise potentially incriminating odors. Viewed together, those acts provided
reasonable suspicion that supported Sergeant Cagle’s less than 30-second deviation to use
the radio. The district court did not err.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court affirm the judgment of the district court.
DATED this 20th day of March, 2019.

/s/ Ted S. Tollefson
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Deputy Attorney General
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